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BOOK REVIEWS
MARBLE PALACE. THE SUPREME COURT IN AwERiCAN Li. By John P. Frank.
Alfred A. Knopf, New York: 1958. Pp. 302. $5.00.
It is rather late in the day to examine the virtues and vices of Marble Palace.,
Professor Frank's "lively and informal book about the Supreme Court"2 has already
been variously reviewed by various reviewers. Mr. Paul C. Bartholomew, com-
menting in the pages of America,3 found it informative as well as informal; and
America's annual survey of literature 4 counted it in the top "five worthy of note"
in the non-fiction field. The New York Times5 was not so kind to Professor Frank
and certainly not so generous. There Mr. Anthony Lewis pumped a steady, critical
fire. He enjoyed a Sunday trapshoot of Frank's comments, critiques, and anecdotes.
He found the book without "any real insight into the Supreme Court" and left it
damned as one which makes no "significant contribution to the sparse literature" on
the affairs of the Supreme Court.
Oddly enough there is merit in both reviews. Professor Frank's stories and essays
are pellucid if not penetrating. He is most informal. While his informality often
falls across the superficial he is seldom dull. His informality does, however, sacrifice
the studied analysis which accuracy demands. Accuracy demands completeness too.
It requires the whole rather than a casual summary of the parts. Professor Frank
does not probe. He does not sift the complex circumstances, the more profound
policies, the sometimes amorphous philosophies which influenced the more significant
decisions of the Court. He is content to paint with softer strokes. His lighter touch
produces a pastel of things not as they are but as they seem to be.
This much Professor Frank just about confesses in his preface. "Some of what
I say," he forewarns us, "will be based on gossip or hearsay-but I would not put it
1. Professor Frank's "Marble Palace" is the home of the Supreme Court of the United
States. He writes of the Court itself. The jacket of the book spells out its content and
its purpose. We are told that this is "the story of the Court and how it works from the
inside." The jacket cover continues, "it shows what work the 'nine old men' do, how they
do it, and what political, personal, or other motives come into play. . . . In its broadest
sense, Marble Palace deals with the practicalities of power, not with legal theory. It
shows the impact of the Court's power on American life through the decisions it makes
and the way it enforces them. Mr. Frank tells us how the Justices are chosen, how
lawyers persuade the Court to their view, how the Justices confer among themselves,
negotiate to consolidate their views, write opinions, concurring opinions and dissents. We
are shown the idiosyncrasies of many famous Justices ... how their personalities were
accommodated by their brothers ... their relations with one another (including some
famous quarrels), and about their tendency to form cliques and blocs. . . .[We are told]
the kinds of work the Court does: as an umpire in the fights among the other parts of
the government; in respect to freedom of speech, press, religion, fair trials, and race
relations; in regard to business and prosperity; in regard to foreign relations and the
jurisdiction over the military."
John P. Frank served as law clerk to Mr. Justice Black in 1942. For eight years he
taught constitutional law and Supreme Court studies at Indiana University and at the
Yale Law School.
2. Also taken from the jacket eulogy of the book.
3. America, October 25, 1958, p. 111.
4. America, November 29, 1958, p. 290.
5. New York Times, Book Review Section for Sunday, October 16, 1958.
BOOK REVIEWS
down if I did not believe it-and some on personal observation." The gossip or
hearsay is what seems to disturb the Times' Mr. Lewis. The gossip, he suggests,
contaminates the whole. Because the book is not pervasive it is poor.
But is there any reason why Professor Frank must write a profound treatise?
Why may he not be casual with those who sit in the high-backed chairs of the marble
palace? Must hearsay comments on the law be left to Mr. Pickwick, to W. S.
Gilbert and "Trial by Jury" or to the New Yorker and "Talk of the Town"? Pro-
fessor Frank is not a Dickens, a Gilbert or an E. B. White. But it is intellectual
snobbery -to conclude that he must, therefore, be profound or fail. He has chosen
to give us some passing knowledge of the Supreme Court and its processes. He has
not prepared a full course feast but rather some pastry sugared- more often, as a
matter of fact, by his personal observations than by the gossip which Mr. Lewis
dislikes. The product is tasty enough and for that reason satisfying.
It should be noted that Professor Frank generates interest as he proceeds. He is
off to a shallow start in his first chapter. There he seeks to sketch the importance
of Supreme Court decisions on our day to day affairs; he seeks to find some earthli-
ness and earthiness in the deliberations of the Justices who write the decisions.
Frank seems to be writing his first chapter for Rudolph Flesch's "Johnnny." It is
simplification reduced to simplicity.
Interest gains momentum when he writes of the Chief Justices, of the law as
literature and he is at his best when he considers the "special functions" of the
Court with respect to civil liberties, economic developments, and international rela-
tions. It is unfortunate that at times you sense an inconsistency in his treatment
of the Justices and their decisions. At times Frank himself emerges as a freshly
scrubbed altar boy standing in awe before the cardinals of the marble palace. You
sometimes wish he played more often the part of a renegade priest ready to castigate,
criticize, and argue with those whom he has served.
Mr. Justice Black is his high priest. As a former secretary to the Justice he is a
loyal acolyte. He says of Black that "he is never intimidated by the new ideas of
anyone else simply because they are new. . . . He is highly capable of creating new
ideas himself. Black mingles a deep respect for history with an absence of fear of it.
He draws liberally on seventeenth-century English experience, and his Livy is marked
from one end to the other with his own notes, but his view is still forward. To the
public utility field, state regulations of business, the patent system, the right to
counsel, the obligations of states generally to honor all of the civil rights established
in the Constitution, freedom of speech, and, most recently, to the right to practice
the professions, Black has brought more new ideas than anyone else who was ever
a member of the Court." He testifies that Black, unlike his colleagues, has an instinct
to put his finger on the vital point in the case being argued; that Black will labor
long hours to read all there is to be read concerning the case before him. Black's
style is "precise." He uses "a simple and strong vocabulary, wrings out the water
and deletes the superfluous word or citation or paragraph." Black he puts as one of
the four (with Rutledge, Douglas and Murphy) "stoutest exponents of individual
liberty ever to sit on the bench." And, "among the great creative minds in the twen-
tieth century have been Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Black." Frank's loyalty is
as commendable as its constancy is incautious.
With others he is not always the altar boy. He has no reverence for Willis Van
Devanter ("whose most peculiar achievement is that for perhaps his last ten years
on the Supreme Court he averaged some three opinions a year"); for Joseph R.
Lamar ("who is remembered, if at all, only by his grandchildren"); for Edward T.
Sanford ("who was known at the time of his appointment as Ca little slow' in getting
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out his work, and who disabused no one thereafter"); for McReynolds ("the most
fanatic and hard-bitten conservative extremist ever to grace the Court . . . who got
over the hard spots by drawing a line across the center of the page and going on to
another topic"); or for Pierce Butler ("presenting an argument to Mr. Justice Butler
was like shooting darts at a brick wall").
Professor Frank is also concerned with the literary merits of the Justices. He has
added an appendix containing a brief critique of the styles of several Justices-
skipping from the "legal lumpy" of Shiras to the "legal massive" of Stone to the
"legal lucid" of Holmes. And in one or two earlier chapters he finds a somewhat
wasted effort the inevitable concurring and dissenting opinions which have become
the vogue in recent years. To that I would add a grand amen. And I would also add
that it would be comforting, too, were the opinions of the Justices directed less at
Bartlett and more at the case before the Court. Too often the Court's opinions sub-
merge the particular facts of the particular case under consideration in a grandilo-
quence which leaves the principle of law distinctly unclear. They too often have the
ring of something written solely for the literary edification of posterity. Even so
gifted a stylist as Mr. Justice Douglas sounds maudlin in Carroll v. Lanza when he
tells us that he writes "not only for this case and this day alone, but for this type
of case." 6 If written opinions reflect the case before the Court and do so intelli-
gently, clearly and concisely, the future will not have to be told where to find the
patterns by which to shape itself.
LEONARD F. MANNINGf
SuMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEW YORK. By David George Paston. Central Book
Company, Inc., New York: 1958. Pp. 450. $10.00.
Summary Judgment in New York is a delightful, stimulating work on the subject
of summary judgment. It is written in a fluent, lucid style which quickly gains the
reader's interest and lends itself to perceptive, easy reading. It is devoid of cumber-
some overtones which, unhappily, often accompany legal writing, yet, it carries a
sound, scholarly approach and treatment of the subject matter amply supported by
authority.
Mr. Paston begins his book by stating the scope of his work and defining summary
judgment. Then rapidly, he takes us back to the days before we had summary judg-
ment when obviously false pleadings prevented judgment; to the enactment of Rule
113, Rules of Civil Practice, in 1921, with its subsequent amendments; to the manner
in which summary judgment and partial summary judgment work; to the actions
in which plaintiff and defendant may move for summary judgment; to the proof
required to grant or deny the motion; to the effect of summary judgment, and to
summary judgment in the federal courts and other jurisdictions.
Of particular interest are chapters IV and XVI, the former dealing with needed
reforms and reforms recommended by the author, and the latter with summary judg-
ment in particular actions. To accomplish the desired reform a new Rule 113 is
proposed. The proposed Rule would delete the nine classes of action in which a
plaintiff may presently move for summary judgment and would make summary
judgment available to both plaintiff and defendant in any action. To the busy lawyer,
Chapter XVI should prove an invaluable reference. Here summary judgment in
particular actions is deftly arranged alphabetically according to the substantive or
6. 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955).
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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adjective law involved. Two hundred pages are devoted to a clear and concise
examination of applicable law indexed on a topical basis ranging from accord and
satisfaction to zoning resolutions.
The practical considerations involved in the motion for summary judgment are
ably treated in Chapter XVII. Here, one hundred and twenty-four pages are devoted
to suggested forms, affidavits and notice of motion for use by both plaintiff and
defendant. The streamlining of affidavits and briefs for use in connection with the
motion for summary judgment is recommended and a complete case on appeal with
attendant forms and papers is profitably set forth. Five pages (pp. 393-98) carry
the summary judgment statutes in New York and in the federal courts and thirty-
eight pages (pp. 400-38) are devoted to summary judgment law in jurisdictions
other than New York.
Briefly, the contents of Summrry Judgment in New York are so ably arranged
that busy practitioners may now have a quick, ready reference of case law, forms,
procedures, and suggested procedures in preparing to move or oppose a motion for
summary judgment or to appeal an adverse decision. It is a sound, useful, and well
documented book and should prove a valuable addition to the legal .library.
JosEPH N. FouRNiE4
THE IDEA oi FREEDOm. By Mortimer J. Adler. Doubleday & Co., Garden City:
1958. Pp. xxvii, 689. $7.50.
This monumental volume is the result of five years' work by more than twenty
scholars at the Institute for Philosophical Research. Their labors were directed by
Dr. Adler who undertook the task of incorporating the results of their studies in a
book. There is a general introduction which describes the aims of the Institute.
It was founded to take stock of Western thought on those subjects which have been
of continuing philosophical interest from, roughly, the days of Thales to the present.
The reason for the-need of such an inventory is the fact that twenty-five centuries
of inquiry on these subjects have not produced a body of universally accepted ideas.
The members of the Institute do not approach their work in an historical or rela-
tivistic fashion. While, like the historian, they take the existing diversity of opinion
as their point of departure, they proceed on the assumption that the recorded agree-
ments and disagreements give rise to controversies about matters on which objective
truth is ascertainable. They are concerned with discovering these agreements and
disagreements in order to clarify issues that call for further resolution.
Then the method which was used to study two thousand, five hundred years of
thought about freedom is explained. Dr. Adler is of the opinion that the same
method will be at least generally applicable to other basic ideas. This method is
non-historical. The materials are abstracted from their historical contexts. The pro-
ponents of the various opinions are treated as if they were contemporaries partici-
pating in actual discussion. The method is also non-philosophical. No attempt is
made by the members of the Institute to develop a theory of their own on the
subject under discussion nor are any of the opinions advanced proposed as true.
Their aim is to develop an hypothesis about the controversies, explicit and implicit,
contained in the literature of an idea. Their approach is non-partisan; while they
describe controversies they take no part in them. By these means Dr. Adler and
his colleagues hope to make some contribution to the solution of the problem of
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1958-59]
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cultural pluralism which they regard as bound to exist in a free society. In the
opinion of Dr. Adler at least, where a whole society agrees on fundamental subjects
it can safely be inferred that such uniformity is enforced. But, he remarks, as
tyranny is not the only alternative to anarchy in politics, so, in the intellectual life,
there is a middle ground between an anarchic diversity which obliterates intellectual
community and a regimented conformity which would crush intellectual diversity.
By using the method developed at the Institute, Dr. Adler and his colleagues hope
to help in the formation of a condition of "diversity within the framework of an
intellectual community." The aim is to discover the extent and kinds of agreement
that exist among men about what is true. When that is accomplished men may
profitably engage in controversy, which is distinguished from polemics, on the points
about which they differ. At least it is hoped they will know what they are talking
about.
The task of rendering an objective, impartial, neutrally formulated report of the
centuries-old discussion of freedom is then undertaken. From a survey of the evi-
dence it becomes clear that men have used the word 'freedom' in senses so diverse
that they are referring to different things. Epictetus was a slave and many writers
would regard him as an excellent example of a person who was not free. But he was
also a Stoic philosopher and regarded himself as a free man, at least as free as the
Emperor Marcus Aurelius who was striving for the same kind of freedom as Epic-
tetus. According to Hobbes, Boethius in prison would be another excellent example
of a man who was not free. But Boethius, consoling himself with philosophy, did
not regard Theodoric's jail as totally confining. From this survey it appears that
there is a general controversy on freedom. There are writers who, in discussing
freedom, look only to the circumstances that affect a man's ability to carry out his
wishes, to do as he likes. There are others who do not regard this as freedom at all.
For them freedom consists in doing as one ought and they look to the state of mind
or character which enables a man willingly to act in this fashion. Father Zossima
in the Brothers Karamazov speaks for the latter; Jeremy Bentham, for the former.
Among those who look to circumstances as crucial in the matter of freedom, there
are those who look only to external circumstances, freedom from coercion. There
are others who think this is only the negative side of freedom. Positive power is
also necessary and R. H. Tawney gives the example of a man who wishes to dine at
the Ritz. He is not prevented by external circumstances, but he is not free to go
there unless he can afford to pay for his dinner. Among those who think that freedom
consists in doing as one ought, there are those, like Spinoza, who think the ability
so to act lies fully within the powers of human nature. There are others, like
Augustine, who regard this ability as beyond man's unaided strength.
So the 'dialectic' proceeds. As a result, three kinds of freedom are distin-
guished. There is circumstantial freedom, freedom depending on circumstances;
there is acquired freedom, freedom consisting in an attitude of mind; and there is
natural freedom, freedom inherent in all men regardless of circumstances or states
of mind. The various writers whose ideas on freedom fall under these genera are
listed and strange bedfellows appear. Aquinas precedes Spinoza in one list and fol-
lows Maimonides in two others. Dewey follows Hegel in one, Freud in another and
Bergson in a third. Freedom, having been distinguished by reference to its mode of
possession, is further distinguished by reference to the mode of self that carries with
it the ability in which freedom is thought to consist. To circumstantial, acquired and
natural freedom it is found that several ideas correspond in whole or part. Self-
realization corresponds to the ability of an individual to act as he wishes, self-perfec-
tion to his acquired ability to live as he ought, self-determination to his natural
[Vol. 2 7
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ability to decide for himself what he wishes to do or become. The authors are grouped
again. Consequently three main subjects of controversy are identified: the circum-
stantial freedom of self-realization, the acquired freedom of self-perfection and the
natural freedom of self-determination. Two other subjects, special variants of one
or the other main subjects, are indicated, political freedom and collective freedom.
Issues can now be joined.
The question of the necessity of such exhaustive and exhausting analysis naturally
arises. Unfortunately it seems necessary in the present state of intellectual confusion,
and this book is one of undoubted value. However, the painstaking application of
the method employed becomes painful. In the interests of clarity there is too much
repetition. The author's style is redolent of chalk dust. If the average man is to
have a clear idea of freedom, a condensed version of this work is desirable.
VINCENT C. HOPrINS, S.J.-
WORMSER's GumE To ESTATE PLANNING. By Rene A. Wormser. Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs: 1958. Pp. 175. $4.95.
It is not uncommon in today's age of tax emphasis for the layman to become
increasingly confused as to the proper method of planning and disposing of his estate.
He is listening to advice from his insurance broker, banker, accountant, and lawyer
on the various benefits of the new tax laws as they are promulgated-why he should
make this gift, sell that asset or change his present form of business. As he reads
and listens to his advisors, the average individual either decides that this whole tax
and estate planning business is too complicated and refrains from doing anything or
he makes a hasty move which he usually regrets at a later date. Where does the
fault lie? It stems from the fact that most of the writing and advice on estate
planning is directed at the means of achieving various ends instead of pointing out
the objectives that first should be sought.
Mr. Wormser's book is noteworthy in that it is concerned principally with the
objectives of estate planning. He has written an excellent book on this subject,
primarily intended for the layman, but one that will also stimulate thought in the
mind of the lawyer and the technician. The family's and the individual's welfare
should be kept principally in mind, rather than placing emphasis on tax savings.
However, the author points out that the individual would be foolish were he not
"alert to possible tax savings."
The family's welfare is stressed mainly in the chapters on planning for the wife
and children. Questions are raised in the mind of the reader. What type of a wife
do you have? How much will you give your wife? How mature will your children
be when they reach majority? Whom will they fiharry? Should all children be
treated alike? The author tries to stimulate the reader's thinking on the qualities
of their wives and children through a general list of their characteristics, so that
the husband-father will be better able to make plans for their future security. In
making these plans, the head of the family is advised to give his wife and children
investment training. The children should be instructed at an early age.
Most of the suggestions given on the disposition of assets to the wife and children
have greater significance for persons of substantial wealth, but they have unques-
tioned value to those of less means. At the same time, the objectives sought to be
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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attained should be considered by everyone who may later be faced with an estate
planning problem for which he has made no earlier preparation.
Though Mr. Wormser regards continuing inflation as inevitable, nevertheless it
is his advice that the first money available to the young father should be invested
by him in life and health insurance, the sole purpose of this investment being imme-
diate protection. As time goes on and savings increase, his insurance program should
be enlarged and some money invested in assets other than insurance. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of mutual funds, variable annuities, real estate, tax exempt
securities and investments in one's own business are briefly but well covered.
It is important to know how to invest your money, but it is equally important to
know what occupation is best suited for the young father and what he should do
when this occupation ceases to exist. The author gives the reader some new thoughts,
in an estate planning treatise, on the subjects of occupation and retirement. He
treats not only the father's occupation, but also the steps that a father should take
to assist his children in the proper selection of their field of endeavor.
With more and more companies adopting a compulsory retirement age of sixty-
five, and with the increase of the average life expectancy, the problem of what to
do upon retirement assumes greater prominence. There have been discussions by
many writers on this subject with a good deal of stress on monetary protection;
Mr. Wormser's book is no exception. He does, however, point out that wealth will
not necessarily make a man happy upon retirement if his time is not properly
occupied. Expressing, perhaps, a bit of his personal philosophy, he suggests that
the worker, prior to his retirement, embark upon some charitable, educational or
other form of work which he might pursue in his later years.
There are other topics covered by the author which pertain to a relatively small
group of people. In his treatment of the family enterprise, Mr. Wormser discusses
the continuance and discontinuance of the business, its financing and reorganization,
and the mechanisms for its succession. For those readers who now face heavy tax
burdens and who are also charitably inclined, they would do well to consider the
chapter on charities because of the many tax savings to be achieved through char-
itable gifts in one form or another.
It should not be forgotten that, although this book is principally directed at the
layman, it would be wise for the lawyer, accountant, insurance advisor, broker, and
investment counsel to read this book. They are the people who should be in a
position best to assist him in formulating his objectives.
Too many individuals, regardless of their financial position, avoid the subject of
estate planning mainly through ignorance. The subject is best handled, in their
opinion, by the experts. While the execution of estate planning ideas is still a matter
for the experts, the objectives of estate planning are the layman's own personal
problem, and Mr. Wormser has succeeded in stimulating interest in these objectives.
So that this book can reach the wide audience it deserves, it would be well for
those in the estate planning field to recommend it to their clients' careful reading.
PETER D. MuRRAYt
f Member of the New York Bar.
